# AFF ANSWERS

### 2AC---DIB UQ

#### The Ukraine confilct has exposed weakness in the DIB and Bidens budget doesn’t leave room for growth in the industry

**Clark**, Maiya. “The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?” *The Heritage Foundation*, **2019**, www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep.

To some degree, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has served as a stress test for the West’s defense industrial base. From that has come a growing recognition that, for too long, America has underestimated the amount of munitions and platforms required in modern warfare. Due to the complexity and time required to manufacture today’s precision weapons, we must start thinking now, before a war breaks out, about whether America has enough weaponry to sustain a conflict. Last month President Biden released a defense budget request that does not even keep up with the rate of inflation, much less provide for any growth to meet our own needs. It’s a recipe for weakness at a time when the free world desperately needs strength.

#### The DIB got a failing grade in industry health -- The industry is down bad

Stephen Losey 02-11-2022 [Air warfare reporter at Defense News; previously reported for Military.com, covering the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare; Before that, covered U.S. Air Force leadership, personnel and operations for Air Force Times], “COVID drags defense industrial base down to failing grade,” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/02/11/covid-drags-defense-industrial-base-down-to-failing-grade/

WASHINGTON — The National Defense Industrial Association gave the defense industrial base an overall failing grade for the first time ever, as the [ongoing COVID pandemic](https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/01/28/as-covid-grinds-on-defense-sector-braces-for-inflation-hit/) continues to upend the sector. In its third annual Vital Signs report released Feb. 2, NDIA gave the industrial base a health and readiness score of 69 out of 100, which it deems an unsatisfactory and failing grade and “cause for real concern.” NDIA, which worked on the report with decision science company Govini, scores categories on a 100-point scale, and scores below 70 are considered failing. The association based most of its study on data sources from 2020, the first year of the pandemic and before vaccinations began, so some of these results are lagging indicators. NDIA said the two of the eight key categories it uses to measure the health of the defense industry — the [supply chain](https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/11/23/no-company-is-immune-supply-chain-woes-weigh-on-defense-firms/) and companies’ production capacity and ability to surge if necessary — have deteriorated significantly, “almost certainly” due to the pandemic’s effects. Three other categories — industrial security, innovation and production inputs — also received failing scores in 2021, though production inputs and industrial security saw slight improvements over the previous two years. And with the pandemic continuing, the association added, it is crucial for the nation to figure out how to sort out these problems. However, NDIA said it opted not to offer policy recommendations, support specific legislative or regulatory changes, or call for investments in the report.

#### Americans Believe the U.S. is Falling Behind in Innovation

Gholz & Sapolsky 21 (Eugene Gholz & Harvey M. Sapolsky (2021) The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge, Journal of Strategic Studies, 44:6, 854-872, DOI: [10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392). shARK)

The United States is the most powerful nation in the world.[1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392) It has the most powerful military, the biggest economy, and the most dominating culture. **It is the world’s leader in science, engineering, and medicine.** Its universities are the most admired. Its corporations are the richest and most successful. People eat Big Macs, drink Coca Cola, fly on Boeings, use their iPhones, and watch Hollywood movies around the globe. Everyone knows the name of the American president, what the CIA does, and who you should call if there is trouble on your border. The United States is also a very secure country. It is surrounded by two big oceans and two unthreatening neighbors. Its surveillance systems scour the globe looking for dangers. It has nuclear weapons, a Navy and Coast Guard on constant patrol, an Air Force on high alert and with a global reach, and an Army and Marine Corps second to none in capability and recent combat experience. **But many Americans believe that this is all slipping away, that America is becoming vulnerable and losing its power and dominance**. They cite internal and external sources of the vulnerability. American power, they claim, is being frittered away by a dysfunctional Congress, an incompetent president, and a bloated, slow moving, gold-plating acquisition bureaucracy that cannot keep up. Indecision and gridlock have seemingly become the American Way of government. Meanwhile, some **fear that agile rival nations, specifically including China, can tap fast moving commercial technology to build modern weapons that will defeat the United States.**[**2**](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392) Here we examine these concerns that the American military advantage in the Post-Cold War era has dissipated in large part because the Defense Department lags behind in developing advanced technologies. Our judgment is that the American defense research and development system, as honed during the Cold War and expanded since, is fully capable of handling any military challenge. It is a gigantic technology-generating, innovation-producing, war-fighting machine. U.S. ‘hard’ innovation capabilities – ‘input and infrastructure factors’ like R&D facilities, human capital, access to foreign technology, and availability of funding – far outstrip those of its potential rivals, even though those factors are the ones often thought of as easier for catch-up countries to obtain.[3](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392) Despite warnings that the United States no longer spends enough on R&D and that Chinese R&D spending is surging, the reality is that the United States dramatically leads in military innovation investment. In functional terms, the United States dominates all other countries, including China, in ‘input factors,’ starting with resource allocations to defense research and development. More important, we believe that the American defense technology system is pushed toward innovation by specific contextual factors, the ‘soft’ categories of attributes and capabilities, that cannot readily transfer to likely rivals.[4](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392)

### 2AC---DIB Link Defense

#### Precautionary policies good

Maciej Kuziemski 05-01-2018 [Published in Project Syndicate; Data program adviser at the Ditchley Foundation], “A Precautionary Approach to Artificial Intelligence,” <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/precautionary-principle-for-artificial-intelligence-by-maciej-kuziemski-2018-05> Cut By: m.jam

Even without reliable data, decision-makers must move forward with AI governance. And, as the world waits for scientific certainty (which may never arrive), there is an existing solution that can guide us into the unknown: the “precautionary principle.” Adopted globally in 1992 as part of the United Nations [Rio Convention](http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm) on sustainable development, and later incorporated into one of the [European Union’s founding treaties](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=celex:12016E191), the precautionary principle states that a lack of certainty cannot be a basis for failing to protect human health or the environment. That seems like a suitable way to address the uncertainty of a tech-driven future. The precautionary principle is not without its detractors. But while its merits have been debated for years, we need to accept that the lack of evidence of harm is not the same thing as evidence of lack of harm. This simple idea has been applied to [myriad human development issues](http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/91173/E83079.pdf) – from public health to infant mortality. There are three good reasons why AI should be next. For starters, applying the precautionary principle to the context of AI would help rebalance the global policy discussion, giving weaker voices more influence in debates that are currently monopolized by corporate interests. Decision-making would also be more inclusive and deliberative, and produce solutions that more closely reflected societal needs. The [Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers](http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/autonomous_systems.html), and [The Future Society](https://assembl-civic.bluenove.com/ai-consultation/home) at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government are already spearheading work in this participatory spirit. Additional professional organizations and research centers should follow suit. Moreover, by applying the precautionary principle, governance bodies could shift the burden of responsibility to the creators of algorithms. A requirement of explainability of algorithmic decision-making can change incentives, prevent blackboxing, help make business decisions more transparent, and allow the public sector to catch up with the private sector in technology development. And, by forcing tech companies and governments to identify and consider multiple options, the precautionary principle would bring to the fore neglected issues, like environmental impact. Rarely is science in a position to help manage an innovation long before the consequences of that innovation are available for study. But, in the context of algorithms, machine learning, and AI, humanity cannot afford to wait. The beauty of the precautionary principle lies not only in its grounding in international public law, but also in its track record as a framework for managing innovation in myriad scientific contexts. We should embrace it before the benefits of progress are unevenly distributed, or, worse, irreversible harm has been done.

#### Distinction between military and civilian innovation – the plan doesn’t hurt the bulwark of the DIB

Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen 2017 “MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS” November 2017 Stockholm International peace research institute https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport\_mapping\_the\_development\_of\_autonomy\_in\_weapon\_systems\_1117\_1.pdf

The innovation ecosystem that is driving the advance of autonomy in weapon systems is diffuse, chiefly because the technologies, academic disciplines and industry sectors involved in the development of autonomous capabilities may vary greatly depending on the type of application and systems at issue. Nevertheless, three general observations can be made. First, much of the fundamental research in the fields of AI and robotics that could feed the advance of autonomy in weapon systems is dual-use. The divergence between civilian and military innovation generally emerges towards the development end of the R&D cycle because civilian and military products often need to meet different performance criteria. Hence, should CCW delegates eventually engage in a formal discussion on the monitoring or regulation of R&D efforts that could lead to the development and production of LAWS, they should focus on the development end of the R&D cycle, as this is where the actual capabilities of LAWS will be definitively created. Attempting to monitor and control R&D at the more basic research level would be challenging from a practical perspective and possibly problematic as it could threaten civilian innovation. Second, the barriers to entry to the development of robotic systems are very low. Nearly all hardware components that might serve the development of autonomous robots are commercially available. It is even possible to acquire off-the-shelf low-cost robotic systems that feature advanced autonomous capabilities. These may be adopted, modified and weaponized by states but also, and more worryingly, by non-state actors seeking, for instance, to conduct terrorist operations. This scenario has not yet received great attention within the CCW discussions on LAWS, despite the fact it represents an imminent humanitarian risk. While it falls outside the traditional scope of the CCW, it would be prudent for the GGE to allocate some time to this issue in 2018. It could start a discussion on the options that are offered outside the CCW to control or limit the diffusion and malevolent use of key technologies. This could include discussing the possibilities offered by export control mechanisms and self-control by the industry. Third, future discussions on the development and control of autonomy in weapon systems could usefully benefit from further exchanges of experience with the civilian sector, especially companies developing safety-critical applications of autonomy (e.g. aerospace companies, carmakers and medical robot companies), considering that a number of issues that are central to discussion on LAWS have already been, or are currently being, actively addressed within the civilian sphere. These issues include the following. 1. How to define and measure autonomy? This question has been the concern of standardization and regulatory bodies for a long time. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission have had multiple projects aimed at generating an official definition of robot-associated terms, including ‘autonomy’ (ISO 8373:2012). In addition, the US National Highway Traffic Safety Association has adopted the Society of Automotive Engineers’ levels of autonomy for self-driving systems, ranging from complete driver control to full autonomy.110 2. How to operationalize meaningful human control? Civilian industry sectors that produce safety-critical systems (e.g. aerospace, automotive and medical robotics) are facing the same human control dilemmas as the defence sector. They too are dedicating their efforts to finding a model of the human–machine command-and-control relationship that will maximize safety. 3. How to test the safety and predictability of autonomous technologies? The commercial aerospace sector has procedures to test and verify advanced automated systems. Inviting experts from this community to talk about existing procedures would help to identify possible best practices for testing and evaluating weapons with advanced autonomous capabilities in the context of Article 36 reviews.

### 2AC---LAWS Don’t get bought

#### DOD policy means they can’t even buy LAWS

Gregory C. Allen, 22, (Gregory C. Allen, Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, 6-6-2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread, 7-3-2022) SCade

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely. In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under secretary of defense for policy; and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence. Getting the signatures of the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officer and two under secretaries in a formal senior review is no easy task. Perhaps the strongest proof of the rigor required to surpass such a hurdle is the fact that no DOD organization has even tried.

### 2AC---Heg Defense

#### No leadership impact – empirics.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>, 06-03-2020

Like many believers, **proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone**.41 **There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for** the **pacific trends** that have swept across the system. In fact, **the world remained equally peaceful**, relatively speaking, **while the U**nited **S**tates **cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century**.42 **Complex statistical methods** should not be needed to **demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.** Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. **The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent**, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. **Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to**. **The U**nited **S**tates **can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts**. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal **violence in**, say, **most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention**. **The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history**, **something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit**.43 **Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.** Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

#### Alternative explanations for stability outweigh.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>, 06-03-2020

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 **It is quite likely that the world does not need the U**nited **S**tates **to enforce peace**. In fact, **if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse**. **None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested** (**economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war**) **seem poised to disappear any time soon**.50 **The world will probably continue its peaceful ways** for the near future, at the very least, **no matter what the U**nited **S**tates **chooses to do or not do**. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

\*only read if they read the SCS scenario\*

**No SCS war this decade –** China will avoid confrontation**.**

Yuan 20 – Shaoyu, author of “Panda Not Dragon: Why The Rise of China is not a Threat”. Yuan’s works have appeared on multiple scholarly journals and conferences, with topics including the conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands, South Korea’s cultural influence on Modern China, and others. He is currently completing his doctoral degree at Rutgers University. Yuan received his B.A. from Centre College and his M.S. from Northeastern University. “South China Sea Threat Assessment: Is China a Threat or a Paper Tiger?”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/02/20/south-china-sea-threat-assessment/>, 02-20-2020

Tensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s Rear Admiral Lou Yuan, regarded as a hawkish military commentator, recently proclaimed that the continuing dispute over the ownership of the South China Sea could be resolved by sinking two US aircraft carriers. Statements like these result in a legitimate fear that China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea might spark a kinetic military conflict with the United States. However, **while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region.** Despite China’s constant verbal objections and rising tensions with the United States in the last century, **the world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers**. **China will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective.** **China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness.** **If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable**. However, even as it boasts the second largest defense spending figures worldwide, **China only recently created their first and only joint command system**, the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), under President Xi Jinping’s new national defense and military reform. In addition, around 70 percent of the PLA soldiers belong to the PLA Army, and almost all senior officers on the CMC are army officers. **This imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications, such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs―areas in which army officers have no experience.** The Chinese are certainly attempting to resolve this problem by establishing departments like the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force, which handles logistical operations and oversees the military supplies, infirmaries, and barracks of the PLA. However, **the “peace disease”―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability―continues to hamper China’s military modernization, as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat**. **If the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so,** **China’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies**. Sea power is crucial for taking control of the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy is divided into the North, East, and South Fleets. Among the four divisions, the PLAN’s South Fleets poses the most immediate threat because it is currently active in the South China Sea. Together, the fleets possess only one aircraft carrier in operation: the Liaoning, an abandoned Soviet-era vessel that was purchased from Ukraine as a training ship, but reportedly had to return to port immediately due to an engine failure during a sea trial. The country’s one and only domestically built aircraft carrier, the Type 001A, is under scrutiny, as it is believed that the carrier manager might have leaked classified information of Liaoning to the CIA. In contrast, the United States possesses nineteen aircraft carriers, far outnumbering the Chinese. Although the number and strength of aircraft carriers do not necessarily determine the victor of a confrontation, the tonnage of a country’s navy might. Larger tonnage provides more space for fuel, weapons, and ammunition, and a vessel with bigger hull not only has more rounds to fire but also the capability to endure longer voyages. The United States Navy has a total tonnage at least two times greater than that of PLAN’s. China also lags in its ballistic missiles. For instance, China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) only began to field its Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) DF-26 in 2016, and **the country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety** Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles **(ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017**. In reality, **China’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea.** Alone, **China’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation** and would therefore be forced to turn to its allies. **China currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region, North Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast**. Although China and North Korea maintained strong relations during the Cold War era, the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship has gradually declined since the beginning of the twenty-first century and the start of North Korea’s nuclear program. China has joined the United Nations in implementing sanctions against North Korea because of its unauthorized nuclear testing. Although China remains North Korea’s closest friend, an alliance is rather far-fetched. Moreover, **the international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the United States can easily depend on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines to provide naval support**. In addition, although the United States is not allied with most of the Southeast Asian nations, **the increasing cooperation between the United States and** the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (**ASEAN) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region**. In contrast, China and ASEAN only had their first joint maritime exercise last year, which mostly focused on the code for unplanned encounters at sea, search and rescue operations, and communication exercises. In addition, **US allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence.** Although China’s navy has recently commissioned the Nanchang guided-missile destroyer (the biggest surface warship ever made), the vessel is only powerful in relation to other **Chinese ships**, which **are around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement.** Consequently, **China is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers** for each of its regional fleets to build the Nanchang. **China may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature.** China is undoubtedly on the rise, yet **the country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military**. Perhaps some of these problems could be resolved with China’s continued growth, but **institutional change―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system―takes a long time**. Based on what defense analysts currently observe, **China does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea**; therefore, there is no need to invest more resources and capital into the Pacific for the time being. However, the United States should maintain its presence in the area by continuing to foster relationships with its allies while keeping a close eye on China’s movements. Sacrificing resources for the sake of military proliferation in a region where such action is unneeded is a wasteful move that the United States should avoid.

**no escalation of SCS disputes** – all sides show restraints

**Bo 20** – Hu, Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Research and Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University. He is also Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI). His most recent publications include China’s Sea Power in the Post Mahan Era by China Ocean Press (2018) and Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century by Routledge (2019). “China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction”, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-us-military-confrontation-in-the-south-china-sea-fact-and-fiction/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>, 06-12-2020

**The** **China-U.S. rivalry** **in the South China Sea** **is certainly growing**, **but war is still some way off.** **There are** several **maritime encounters between the two sides every day**, **and** **thousands** **every year**. **Most of them are professional** **and** **safe**; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation. Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. **China** **feels** that **Washington’s** South China Sea **policy is** increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten **to** **provoke** **China**. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants. **From mid-April to early May**, **the** U.S. **Navy dispatched several warships**, including USS America LHA-6, to the so-called standoff area between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the West Capella **to deter** China’s **operations**. **The PLA Navy** was **believed to have a similar number of warships** there at the same time, **which aroused** **heated discussion** **among the media and experts.** Another less publicized but more intense case was the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning formation when it was conducting open sea cross-region mobile training while followed by American warships and multiple military aircraft. An anonymous PLA Navy officer revealed that the confrontation was so intense that one U.S. warship even once came within 100 meters of the Chinese carrier. **Even so**, **both sides** have **remained** **largely professional** **and** **restrained**. In fact, **neither the Chinese** military **nor the American military has increased** its **activity significantly** **compared** **with the same period of 2019**, **despite the impression** **given by most media reports** **and** **expert commentaries**. The problem is that these operations are over-exposed and over-focused. **In the backdrop of** **power competition**, **especially amid the pandemic**, in order to show their strength and determination, U.S. **forces have given** **undue prominence** **to covering and publicizing** **military activities**, giving the media and the public a lot to discuss and imagine. There are some hawks in both countries who take advantage of this and exaggerate the situation. Although most countries including the South China Sea claimants, do not want to see China-U.S. military conflict, some individual countries are indeed rejoicing over the growing competition between China and the United States, which may lead to some opportunity for them to expand. China-U.S. military confrontation or even war in the South China Sea has a huge market. **China and the** **U**nited **S**tates **are**, of course, **preparing for any kind of** military **conflict** and the **worst scenarios** in the South China Sea; **however**, **there is no indication that the two sides want to resolve** their **contradictions** **by using force strategically or operationally** — **despite the** repeated **war rhetoric** from some senior American officials. **In daily military interactions**, **there are really increasing risks**, **but** **in the absence of a subjective desire for conflict**, **these risks are** **highly** likely to be **controlled**. The most important thing for the Chinese and American militaries to prevent is miscalculation, considering the relatively backward or ineffective crisis management mechanisms of the two countries even compared with Soviet-U.S. and then Russia-U.S. military relations. In addition, we need to let professionals do their work. The China-U.S. military rivalry has been unduly influenced by the media, commentators, and some politicians, which amplifies the intensity of the competition and is likely to lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Both Chinese and the U.S. militaries need to remain competitive and professional, keeping politics and public opinion in check. After all, **if there were to be war**, **it would be the front-line commanders** and sailors **who bear the brunt of it;** **others would be mere bystanders**.

#### No prolif impact

Mueller 19 – John, Senior Research Scientist and Adjunct Professor at Mershon Center for International Security Studies. “Exaggerated Alarm and Destructive Excursions: Antiproliferation Policy and The Case of North Korea” Prepared for presentation at the First World Congress of Security Studies Hosted by the Research Institute for National Security Affairs, Korean National Defense University, <https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/PAKaoKorea19.pdf>, 08-12-2019

The **prolif**eration **of nuclear weapons has been far slower than predicted**, and this seems to be **because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor. Dozens of technologically capable countries have considered** obtaining **nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so.** A key reason for this is that the **possession of such expensive armaments actually conveys in almost all cases rather little advantage** to the possessor. In the main, **they are difficult to obtain, militarily useless, a spectacular waste of time, money, and scientific talent, distasteful, and likely to rile the neighbors.** Moreover, the weapons have also been **exceedingly difficult to obtain for administratively dysfunctional countries.**9 Moreover, the **consequences of what little prolif**eration **has taken place have been substantially benign. Those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats.** For the most part, **they have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit** in rattling them from time to time. **Nor have the weapons proven to be crucial status—or virility—symbols**, although Pakistan and Russia do probably garner more attention that they would if they did not have nuclear weapons. But **how much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or would anybody pay much less if they had none?** Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth? Or with its Olympics? **Prolif**eration **alarmists may occasionally grant that countries principally obtain a nuclear arsenal to counter real or perceived threats, but many go on to argue that the newly nuclear country will then use its nuclear weapons to “dominate”** the area. That argument was repeatedly trotted out with dramatic urgency before 2003 for the dangers supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein, and it is now being applied to Iran. Exactly **how** that **domination** business **is** to be **carried out is never** made **clear.**10 But the notion, apparently, is that should an atomic country rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would supinely bow to its demands. Far more likely, **any threatened states will make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries against the threatening neighbor**—rather in the way they coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.